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CRIMINAL LAW: Applying the General/Specific
Statute Rule in New Mexico-State v. Santillanes
QUENTIN SMITH*
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Constitution' and the New Mexico Constitution 2 each grant
criminal defendants a double jeopardy protection against multiple punishments for
the same offense. 3 The double jeopardy clause functions in this instance "to prevent

the prosecutor from bringing more charges, and the sentencing court from imposing
greater punishments, than the [legislature] intended."4 The "general/specific statute
rule" is a judicially created canon of construction the court employs to limit
prosecutorial discretion by compelling the prosecutor to charge under the more
specific of two statutes when conviction under both would violate the Fifth
Amendment.' In State v. Santillanes,6 the New Mexico Supreme Court attempted to
clarify the proper multiple punishment analysis and the application of the
"general/specific statute rule." This Note will set forth the major
New Mexico
Supreme Court decisions leading up to the Santillanes decision, describe the
multiple punishment analysis set forth by the Santillanes court, identify some
inherent problems with that approach, and set forth some potential solutions for
addressing those problems.
U. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts and Trial CourtDisposition
On September 28, 1996, Nathan Santillanes was driving his vehicle down
Highway 60 in Socorro County with his three children, his girlfriend, and her niece
as passengers.7 Santillanes approached an intersection and attempted to make a lefthand turn. As he was making this turn, an oncoming truck collided with his vehicle.
The five passengers in Santillanes's vehicle were all killed in the collision. At the
time of the accident, Santillanes had a blood alcohol content of. 15 and he admitted
to the police that he had consumed six beers that day.
Santillanes was convicted of five counts of vehicular homicide and four counts
of child abuse resulting in death. The district court sentenced him to eighteen years'
imprisonment for each count of child abuse resulting in death and ordered three of
these sentences to be served consecutively. Santillanes was also sentenced to twelve
years' imprisonment for each count of vehicular homicide, which the district court
* Class of 2003, University of New Mexico School of Law. The author wishes to acknowledge the
invaluable assistance of Professor Barbara Bergman as faculty supervisor and Tamara Ewing as manuscript
editor
for their valuable comments and feedback on this note. Thanks also to my wonderful wife Krista and my
family for
their unconditional support in all my endeavors.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. N.M. CONST.art. 11, § 15.
3. Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410,415 (1980); State v. Pierce, 110 N.M. 76, 84, 792 P.2d 408,416 (1990).
4. Pierce, 110 N.M. at 84-85, 792 P.2d at 416-17 (quoting Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684,
697
(1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
5. See State v. Cleve, 127 N.M. 240, 249-50, 980 P.2d 23, 32-33 (1999).
6. 130 N.M. 464, 27 P.3d 456 (2001).
7. All facts in this section are taken from Santillanes, 130 N.M. at 467, 27 P.2d at 459.
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ordered to be run concurrently with the three consecutive sentences for child abuse
resulting in death.
B. The Rationale of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals held that the defendant's convictions for both vehicular
homicide and child abuse resulting in death violated the defendant's double jeopardy
protection against multiple punishments.8 By holding that the defendant's double
jeopardy rights were violated, the court was next faced with the issue of which
convictions to vacate.9 The court applied the general/specific statute rule and held
that vehicular homicide was a more appropriate charge than child abuse resulting in
death. o
The court first applied the Swafford two-step process for determining whether the
defendant was properly subjected to multiple punishments for vehicular homicide
and child abuse resulting in death." The court found the defendant's conduct to be
unitary because at trial the State used the same conduct of driving while intoxicated
2
to establish vehicular homicide and child abuse resulting in death.1 Next, the court
turned its attention to whether the Legislature intended to create separately
punishable offenses for the unitary conduct. 3 The court found vehicular homicide
and child abuse resulting in death to have different elements, which created a
4
rebuttable presumption in favor of multiple punishments. However, that
presumption was "rebutted by the generally accepted notion that one death should
result in only one homicide conviction."' 5 Therefore, the defendant's convictions for
both vehicular homicide and child abuse resulting in death violated his double
6
jeopardy protection against multiple punishments for the same offense.'
The defendant argued that under the general/specific statute rule, the court should
7
vacate his child abuse resulting in death convictions. The court, relying on the
Guilez "preemption analysis," found that the Legislature's enactment of a
comprehensive motor vehicle code indicated "a legislative intent to preempt the
field.""8 Thus, vehicular homicide, rather than child abuse resulting in death, is the
specific offense under which the State was compelled to prosecute. '9The court also
offered additional indicia of legislative intent to support this conclusion and vacated
2°
the defendant's convictions for child abuse resulting in death.

8. State v. Santillanes, 128 N.M. 752, 756,998 P.2d 1203, 1207 (Ct. App. 2000), rev'd, 130 N.M. 464, 27
P.3d 456 (2001).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 757, 998 P.2d at 1208.
11. Id. at 755-56, 998 P.2d at 1206-07.
12. Id.
13. Santillanes, 128 N.M. at 756, 998 P.2d at 1207.
14. Id.

15.
P.2d 408,
16.
17.
18.
P.2d 131,
19.
20.

Id.
(citing State v. Cooper, 124 N.M. 277, 949 P.2d 660 (1997); State v. Pierce, 110 N.M. 76, 86, 792
418 (1990)).
Santillanes, 128 N.M. at 756, 998 P.2d at 1207.
Id.
Santillanes, 128 N.M. at 757, 998 P.2d at 1208 (quoting State v. Yarborough, 122 N.M. 596, 606, 930
141 (1996)).
Id.
Id. Section 66-8-101.1(C) of the New Mexico Motor Vehicle Code states that where a drunk driver

Spring 2002]

GENERAL/SPECIFIC STATUTE RULE

HI. BACKGROUND
A. The Swafford Test: ProtectingCriminalDefendants Against Multiple
Punishments
The New Mexico Supreme Court took the opportunity in State v. Swafford2t to
develop a Fifth Amendment test for analyzing claims of multiple punishments. The
Swafford court was faced with the issue of determining whether a criminal defendant
could be convicted of both third-degree sexual penetration and incest when the
defendant sexually assaulted his half-cousin.2 2 In addressing this issue, the court
formulated a two-part test for determining legislative intent to punish. The first part
of the inquiry is "whether the conduct underlying the offenses is unitary, i.e.,
whether the same conduct violates both statutes."23 The second part is "whether the
legislature intended to create separately punishable offenses."'24
The Swafford court provided two guiding principles for determining whether the
defendant's conduct was sufficiently unitary to warrant separate punishments. First,
the court must look at the "time or space" between the two charged offenses, i.e., if
the offenses are sufficiently separated by either time or space, then the offenses
cannot be considered unitary.25 If "time or space" considerations do not resolve the
case, then the court must look to the "quality and nature of the acts or to the objects
and results involved."26 After evaluating these factors, if the court finds that the
conduct is not unitary, then the inquiry ends and multiple punishments are
authorized.27
If the conduct is unitary, however, the inquiry must proceed to whether the
Legislature intended multiple punishments for the unitary conduct. 28 In the absence
of clear expression, a court must first apply the Blockburger elements test. 29 Under
this test, if the elements of the two crimes are the same, then multiple punishments
are not intended by the Legislature. Conversely, the court stated that if the elements
are different, then a rebuttable presumption is created that each of the two statutes

causes a pregnant woman to suffer a miscarriage or stillborn birth, the crime is a third-degree felony. Likewise,
Section 66-8-101 makes the death of an adult caused by a drnk driver a third-degree felony. The Santillanes court
states that the Legislature could not intend that the death of a child between birth and 18 years of age should result
in a greater punishment than the death of an unborn child or adult.
21. 112 N.M. 3, 810 P.2d 1223 (1991).
22. In Swafford, the defendant tied his half-cousin to her bed and sexually assaulted her. The defendant was
convicted in district court of third-degree sexual penetration and incest for which he received separate, consecutive
sentences. On appeal, the defendant argued, inter alia, that separate, consecutive sentences for third-degree sexual
penetration and incest violated his double jeopardy protection against multiple punishments for the same offense.
Id. at 6-7, 810 P.2d at 1226-27.
23. Id. at 13, 810 P.2d at 1233.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 13-14, 810 P.2d at 1233-34.
26. Id. at 14, 810 P.2d at 1234 (citing Herron v. State, Ill N.M. 357, 805 P.2d 624 (1991)).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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punish distinct offenses and thus separate punishment under each is not violative of
the defendant's protection against double jeopardy.3"
This rebuttable presumption can be overcome by "other indicia of legislative
intent," including, the "language, history, and subject of the statutes."'" Specifically,
a court should look at whether the statutes protect different social norms and achieve
different policies.32 Also, a court should look at the "quantum of punishment," i.e.,
if one statute has many of the same elements of a base statute and has a greater
penalty than the base statute, the Legislature probably did not intend punishment
under both statutes.3 3 If the presumption can be overcome, then multiple
punishments are prohibited; otherwise, the presumption stands that the Legislature
intended multiple punishments. Figure 1 summarizes the Swafford approach to
determining whether the Legislature intends multiple punishments.
The Supreme Court proceeded to apply the test it formulated to determine
whether the defendant in Swafford should have received multiple punishments for
incest and criminal sexual penetration.3 4 First, the court found no dispute that the
conduct underlying both offenses was the same and thus unitary. 35 The court then
applied the Blockburger elements test and determined that the two offenses were
distinct because each statute contained an element that the other did not, namely that
criminal sexual penetration required coercion and incest required a relation between
the victim and the offender.36 Thus, a rebuttable presumption was raised that the
Legislature intended multiple punishments. This presumption was not overcome
under a "separate evils" inquiry because the court found that the two statutes
achieved different policy objectives-the purpose of the criminal sexual penetration
statute is to prevent forcible, nonconsensual sexual activity; 37 whereas, the incest
statute was designed to prohibit even consensual sexual relations between relatives.3 8
Ultimately, the court found that the defendant's receipt of separate punishments for

30. Id. ("[I]f the elements of the statutes are not subsumed one within the other, then the Blockburger test
raises only a presumption that the statutes punish distinct offenses."). The court seems to create a rebuttable
presumption that multiple punishments are authorized. However, after identifying the various factors to consider
when determining whether this presumption can be overcome, the court cites State v. McGuire, 110 N.M. 304, 308,
795 P.2d 996, 1000 (1990), for the proposition that "[u]nless an intent to punish separately can be found.. lenity
is indicated and, in that event, it is to be presumed the [L]egislature did not intend pyramiding punishments for the
same offense." This statement is clearly contradictory to the rebuttable presumption the court had just created by
assuming that when the elements of the two crimes are not the same it is presumed that the Legislature did not
intend multiple punishments. In application, when the Swafford court reached this part of the analysis, it stated that
a rebuttable presumption was raised that the Legislature intended multiple punishments. However, rather than
merely resting on this presumption, the court seeks out affirmative evidence of the Legislature's intent to authorize
multiple punishments. In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court affirmed that the rebuttable presumption created is
that the Legislature intended multiple punishments. See, e.g., State v. Gonzales, 113 N.M. 221, 225, 824 P.2d 1023,
1027 (1992) (stating that a rebuttable presumption of separate punishments for murder and shooting into a vehicle
was created); State v. Meadors, 121 N.M. 38, 51,908 P.2d 731,744 (1995) (finding that the rebuttable presumption
that the Legislature intended multiple punishments was not overcome).
31. Swafford, 112N.M. at 14, 810P.2dat 1234.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 15, 810 P.2d at 1235.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 35, 810 P.2d at 1235.
37. Id.
38. Id. (citing State v. Hargrove, 108 N.M. 233, 238, 771 P.2d 166, 171 (1989)).
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incest and criminal sexual penetration did not violate his double jeopardy protection
against multiple punishments for the same offense. 9

Figure 1- Swafford Analysis

B. The General/SpecificStatute Rule-A PotentialLimitation on Prosecutorial
Discretion When Multiple PunishmentsAre Not Authorized
The Swafford court found that the defendant's double jeopardy rights were not
violated and that he could be punished separately under both statutes.4 0 However,
if the court had found that the Legislature did not intend multiple punishments for
two separate statutes, then the court would have been left with the task of
determining which statute the Legislature intended to apply to the defendant's
conduct. To aid in making this determination, New Mexico courts have developed
a canon of construction referred to as the "general/specific statute rule."
Court first articulated the "general/specific statute
The New Mexico Supreme
4
rule" in State v. Blevins: '

39. Id.
40. Id. at 15-16, 810 P.2d at 1235-36.
41. 40 N.M. 367, 60 P.2d 208 (1936).
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Where there is one statute dealing with a subject in general and comprehensive
terms, and another dealing with a part of the same subject in a more minute and
definite way...to the extent of any necessary repugnancy... the special
statute.. .will prevail over the general statute, unless 2it appears that the
4
Legislature intended to make the general act controlling.
The Blevins court considered the special statute to be an exception to the general
statute, regardless of the order of passage.43
In State v. Cleve," the Supreme Court felt it was necessary to clarify the
application of the general/specific statute rule. In Cleve, the defendant shot thirteen
deer (five in the abdomen) and he snared two more deer (one died of strangulation
and the other of starvation).45 The State charged the defendant with seven counts of
cruelty to animals (relying on the two snared deer and five deer shot in the
abdomen) and fifteen counts of unlawful hunting. He was convicted of two counts
of cruelty to animals and two counts of unlawful hunting. On appeal, the defendant
argued, interalia,that the unlawful hunting statute was a special law that conflicted
with the general prohibition of cruelty to animals.46
The Cleve court articulated the relationship between the double jeopardy
protection against multiple punishments for unitary conduct and the general/specific
statute rule:
[W]hile the double jeopardy inquiry focuses on whether the Legislature intended
to limit a court's discretion in imposing multiple punishments, the
general/specific statute rule determines whether the Legislature intended to limit
the discretion of the prosecutor in the selection of charges.47

The determination of whether the Legislature intends multiple punishments for
unitary conduct acts as a prerequisite to an inquiry under the general/specific statute
rule.48 The rationale underlying this sequential approach is that if the Legislature
intended to create separately punishable offenses there would be no need to consider
the application of the general/specific statute rule because "a legislative intent to
create multiple punishments necessarily implies that the Legislature also intended
to leave intact the prosecutor's charging discretion."49 However, if the Legislature
did not intend to create separately punishable offenses, one of the convictions would
be unconstitutional; therefore, the general/specific statute rule is a canon of
construction that may be applied to determine which statute should be vacated.5"

42. Id. at 368, 60 P.2d at 209.
43. Id. at 368-69, 60 P.2d at 209.
44. 127 N.M. 240, 980 P.2d 23 (1999).
45. All facts in this paragraph are taken from Cleve, 127 N.M. at 242, 980 P.2d at 25.
46. Cleve, 127 N.M. at 247, 980 P.2d at 30.
47. id. at 250, 980 P.2d at 33.
48. Id. at 248-49, 980 P.2d at 31; see also State v. Ibn Omar-Muhammad, 102 N.M. 274, 694 P.2d 922
(1985) (holding the general/specific statute rule to be inapplicable in determining whether the defendant should have
been prosecuted under vehicular homicide or depraved mind murder statute because the legislature intended
multiple punishments for the conduct).
49. Cleve, 127 N.M. at 251, 980 P.2d at 34.
50. Id.
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In evaluating the defendant's arguments, the court first compared the elements
of the cruelty-to-animals statute with the elements of the unlawful hunting
statute.
The court concluded that double jeopardy would not prevent convictions
for both
of these crimes, and, thus, the court did not address the application
of the
general/specific statute rule to determine whether the unlawful hunting statute
was
an exception to the cruelty-to-animals statute.5'
In reaching this conclusion, the Cleve court did not end its inquiry. The
court
addressed whether the overall statutory scheme of the state's hunting and
fishing
laws preempted the application of the cruelty-to-animals statute with regard
to
conduct covered by the hunting and fishing statutory scheme. The court found
"the
manner of hunting substantially and irreconcilably conflicts with the cruelty-toanimals statute."52 Therefore, the court purported to apply the general/specific
statute rule to conclude that "the Legislature, having dealt with the subject
of the
hunting of game animals more particularly in the game and fish laws, intended
to
create an exception from the cruelty-to-animals statute for hunting and
fishing
activity contemplated by game and fish laws. 5 3
In State v. Guilez,54 the Supreme Court read its decision in Cleve as requiring
two
distinct approaches in determining whether the general/specific statute rule
applies
in a given case. The court identified these separate approaches as a "quasi-doublejeopardy analysis" and a "preemption analysis., 55 In Guilez, the court was
faced
with the issue of whether the defendant was properly convicted under
both the
general child abuse statute and the reckless driving statute.56 The facts revealed
that
the defendant had been pulled over at night for driving without his headlights
on.
The police discovered the defendant's children were passengers who were
not
wearing their seatbelts and the defendant was noticeably intoxicated.
The Guilez court zeroed in on language from Cleve as describing the "quasidouble-jeopardy analysis." This analysis begins by comparing the elements
of the
two crimes.57 The general/specific statute rule then would apply if the two
crimes
are the same, in which case the prosecutor is required to charge the defendant
under
the more specific law absent legislative intent to the contrary.58 If the elements
differed, the court should then "balance the rule of lenity, which favors applying
the
general/specific statute rule in cases of ambiguity, with the judiciary's longstanding
deference to prosecutorial discretion, which favors the exercise of caution
before
applying the general/specific statute rule. ' 59 Additionally, the court should
look to

51.

Id.

52. Id. at 254, 980 P.2d at 37.
53. Id.
54. 129 N.M. 240, 4 P.3d 1231 (1999), abrogatedby Santillanes, 130 N.M.
464, 27 P.3d 456.
55. Guilez, 129 N.M. at 242-43, 4 P.3d at 1233-34.
56. All facts in this paragraph are taken from Guilez, 129 N.M. at 241-42,
4 P.3d at 1232-33.
57. Guilez, 129 N.M. at 243, 4 P.3d at 1234.
58. Id.; see also State v. Yarborough, 120 N.M. 669, 676, 905 P.2d 209,
216 (1995) (stating involuntary
manslaughter and unintentional vehicular homicide both require the same
act and culpability; therefore, the
prosecutor should have charged the defendant with the more specific crime
of vehicular homicide).
59. Guilez, 129 N.M. at 243, 4 P.3d at 1234 (citing Cleve, 127 N.M. at 250,
980 P.2d at 33).
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the plain language, underlying purposes, and histories of the two statutes to ascertain
the Legislature's intent.'
In applying the quasi-double-jeopardy analysis, the court first asked whether the
defendant's conduct was unitary.6' The court stated that the conduct supporting child
abuse began when the child was put in the car; however, the conduct supporting
reckless driving was not established until the defendant continued to drive without
properly functioning headlights.62 Therefore, the court found that the conduct was
not unitary, there was no double jeopardy violation, and that it had no occasion to
apply the general/specific statute rule under a quasi-double-jeopardy analysis.63

Figure 2 - Guilez "Quasi-Double-Jeopardy" Approach

Prosecutor compelled to charge specific
statute absent legislative intent to the
contrary.

Balance rule of lenity against
deference to broad prosecutorial
discretion.

The court then performed a "preemption analysis" in which the question was
"whether the Legislature intended to create an exception to a general statute by
enacting another law dealing with the matter in a more specific way. ' 64 The
emphasis under this analysis was not whether the Legislature intended to limit
prosecutorial discretion, but whether the Legislature intended to repeal by
implication one statute when it passed another more comprehensive statute.65 To
make this determination, a court must look66to the plain language, underlying
purposes, and the histories of the two statutes.
In comparing the language of the two statutes, the Court determined that "one
could reasonably conclude that reckless driving was designed to be 'regarded as an
exception to' child abuse. ' 67 The court then found that the two statutes have

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 241, 4 P.3d at 1232 (citing Cleve, 127 N.M. at 250-51, 980 P.2d at 33-34).
Id. at 244, 4 P.3d at 1235 (citing Swafford, 112 N.M. at 14, 810 P.2d at 1234).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 244-45, 4 P.3d at 1235-36.
Id. at 245, 4 P.3d at 1236 (citing Blevins, 40 N.M. at 368, 60 P.2d at 209).
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different purposes.6 8 Finally, the histories of the two statutes were compared and the
court concluded that the Legislature has steadily increased the penalty for child
abuse, while providing no extra protection for children under the reckless driving
statute. 69 After evaluating these factors, the court held that the reckless driving
statute did not specifically preempt the child abuse statute nor did the Motor Vehicle
Code preempt it in general.7" Thus, the Guilez court concluded that the defendant
could be convicted of both child abuse and reckless driving.

Figure 3 - Guilez "Preemption" Approach

Yes _

2sProsecutor

Look to plain language, purposes,
of two statutes.
and histories
0

compelled to charge
specific statute absent legislative
intent to the contrary.

dernce
precto

No

t ad
dretdon

IV. RATIONALE OF THE SUPREME COURT
On certiorari review, the State did not challenge the determination by the Court
of Appeals that Santillanes's convictions for both vehicular homicide and child
abuse resulting in death violated his double jeopardy protection against multiple
punishments. The sole issue before the Santillanescourt was determining which of
these two conflicting crimes must be vacated. In addressing this issue, the court
established the analytical framework for the application of the general/specific
statute rule, held the general/specific statute rule to be inapplicable in this case, and
applied a modified rule of merger to vacate the defendant's convictions for vehicular
homicide and reinstate the defendant's convictions for child abuse resulting in death.
68. Id. (stating, "The child abuse statute was designed to give greater protection to children than adults" and
"the reckless driving statute punishes conduct that might harm either a member of the general public or any
property").
69. Id.
70. Id. at 246, 4 P.3d at 1237.
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A. The GeneraL/Specific Statute Rule-Establishinga ParticularAnalytical
Framework
In Santillanes, the Supreme Court began its discussion by rejecting the Guilez
finding that application of the general/specific statute rule required two separate
independent analyses. The court held that the determination of whether the
general/specific statute rule applies in a given case does not require independent
"preemption" and "quasi-double-jeopardy" analyses.7' The court stated that "[tihe
primary goal of the general/specific statute rule is to determine legislative intent in
the context of potentially conflicting laws."72 More precisely, in criminal cases, the
goal of the rule is to "determine whether the Legislature intends to punish particular
criminal conduct under a specific statute instead of a general statute. 7 3 A
preemption analysis focusing on whether the specific criminal statute is an exception
to the general statute would be subsumed by the relevant inquiry, which is whether
the Legislature intended particular conduct to be prosecuted under one statute rather
than another. 7'
The court then set forth a particular analytical framework for applying the
general/specific statute rule to potentially conflicting statutes in criminal cases.75 The
starting point for this framework is the double jeopardy protection analysis relating
to multiple punishments, 76 because a legislative intent to create multiple
punishments necessarily implies a legislative intent to leave prosecutorial charging
discretion intact.77 The question is "whether the Legislature intended to create
multiple punishments for the two relevant crimes, even if the defendant was only
charged with or convicted of one of the two crimes at issue. 78
The court explicitly stated that the double jeopardy prohibition against multiple
analysis and the general/specific statute rule require independent
punishments
inquiries. 79 A finding that the underlying conduct forming the basis for both
convictions is not unitary does not foreclose "a further inquiry into a legislative
intent to create multiple punishments for purposes of the general/specific statute
rule.",80 The court found that it erred in Guilez in this respect by foreclosing inquiry
into the legislative intent to create multiple punishments for purposes of the
general/specific statute rule once it found that the conduct was not unitary and thus
71. State v. Santillanes, 130 N.M. 464, 469, 27 P.3d 456, 461 (2001) ("[T]hese labels inaccurately suggest
that there must be two independent analyses undertaken in every case to determine whether the general/specific
statute rule applies; this approach is unwarranted under our prior cases.").
72. Id. (citing State v. Cleve, 127 N.M. 240, 980 P.2d 23 (1999)).
73. Id. (citing Blevins, 40 N.M. at 369, 60 P.2d at 210; Cleve, 127 N.M. 240, 980 P.2d 23).
74. Id. (citing Cleve, 127 N.M. 240, 980 P.2d 23).
75. See id. at 469-71, 27 P.3d at 461-63.
76. Id. at 469, 27 P.3d at 461.
77. Id. at 470, 27 P.3d at 462. The court noted that this inquiry must be conducted regardless of whether a
double jeopardy inquiry is necessary.
78. Id. at 469, 27 P.3d at 461 (citing Blevins, 40 N.M. at 368, 60 P.2d at 209). This inquiry is the second
prong of the Swafford test. See State v. Swafford, 112 N.M. 3, 27, 810 P.2d 1223, 1232 (1991). The court finds that
there is no need to apply the first prong of the Swafford test, whether the conduct is unitary, but rather it must
determine whether the conduct forming the basis of the prosecution under the general statute should have been
prosecuted under the specific statute. Santillanes, 130 N.M. at 470, 27 P.3d at 462.
79. Santillanes, 130 N.M. at 469, 27 P.3d at 461.
80. Id.
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not a violation of the defendant's protection against double jeopardy." Instead, the
court should have focused on the basis of conviction under the general statute to
determine whether the Legislature intended to punish the conduct under the more
specific statute." Under the first inquiry, if the Legislature did not intend to create
separately punishable offenses for the same conduct, the second inquiry becomes
"whether the Legislature intended to limit the charging discretion of the
prosecutor.83
The Santillanescourt states that each of the two inquiries should be answered
under the same framework. First, the Blockburger elements test should be applied
to determine whether each statute requires proof of an additional fact that the other
does not.' If the elements are the same, the general/specific statute rule compels the
prosecutor to charge under the specific statute unless the legislature clearly intends
otherwise.85 Conversely, if the elements differ, two rebuttable presumptions are
created. First, it is presumed that the Legislature intended for multiple
punishments.8 6 Second, it is further presumed that the Legislature intended to leave
prosecutorial discretion intact.87 Each of these presumptions may be overcome by
other indicia of legislative intent.88 The court states that most cases will be resolved
using this framework; however, certain exceptional cases may require additional
89
analysis.
The general/specific statute rule, according to the court, should be used flexibly
in order to achieve the ultimate goal of ascertaining legislative intent.9' However,
always serving as a backdrop is the broad charging discretion of the prosecutor.9
Therefore, the court explicitly required "clear evidence of intent by the Legislature
to limit prosecutorial discretion" before applying the general/specific statute rule.92
Thus, the framework adopted by the Santillanes court for determining whether the
general/specific statute rule applies in a given case is as follows:

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 470, 27 P.3d at 462.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 470-71, 27 P.3d at 462-63.
Id. at 471, 27 P.3d at 463.
Id.
These "other indicia of legislature intent" include (1) the language of the statutes, (2) the purposes of

the statutes, (3) the histories of the statutes, and (4) "whether the violation of one statute will normally result in the
violation of another." See State v. Cleve, 127 N.M. 240, 251-52, 980 P.2d 23, 33-34 (1999).
89. The court holds out Cleve as an exceptional case in which additional analysis was required. To resolve

Cleve, the court had to go beyond the typical elemental analysis to determine "whether the authorization of
particular conduct in one group of statutes resulted in an irreconcilable conflict with the apparent criminalization
of the same conduct in another statute." Santillanes, 130 N.M. at 471, 27 P.3d at 463. It is unclear whether the
situation in Cleve is the only type of exceptional case or if other types of exceptional cases may require a yet
unforeseen additional analysis. The court, though, again stated that the "preempting the field" analysis undertaken
in Guilez was not a proper analysis within the general/specific statute rule, but rather more properly invokes the rule
of repeal by implication. Id.
90. Id. at 472, 27 P.3d at 464.
91. Id. (relying on State v. Brooks, 117 N.M. 751, 755, 877 P.2d 557, 561 (1994), for the proposition that
the State "has broad discretion in charging").
92. Id. at 473, 27 P.3d at 465.
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Figure 4 - Santillanes Framework

B. Applying the Framework-The General/SpecificStatute Rule Is Held to Be
Inapplicableto the Separate Offenses of Vehicular Homicide and Child Abuse
Resulting in Death
The Santillanescourt began its analysis by accepting the conclusion of the Court
of Appeals that the elements of vehicular homicide and child abuse resulting in
death differ under the Blockburger elements test.9" The court also agreed with the
determination by the Court of Appeals that the presumption in favor of multiple
punishments was overcome "by the generally accepted notion that one death should

93. Id.
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result in only one homicide conviction."94 Finally, the court addressed whether the
presumption in favor of broad prosecutorial discretion could be overcome.
The court began this analysis by finding that violation of one of the statutes does
not normally result in violation of the other.95 Additionally, the two crimes have
different purposes-vehicular homicide is intended to punish conduct that places the
general public at risk of death, regardless of the age of the victim; whereas, the child
abuse statute is intended to give greater protection to children than adults.96 The final
factor considered was the history of the child abuse statute, which also indicated a
legislative intent to expand protection for children.97 The court, in considering these
indicia of legislative intent, found it to be clear that "the Legislature did not intend
to limit the discretion of the prosecutor in charging an individual who caused the
death of a child in a manner that meets the elements of both crimes with the
violation of either [child abuse resulting in death] or [vehicular homicide] when the
crime occurred during the operation of a vehicle."98 Thus, the court concluded that
the general/specific statute rule was inapplicable in this case, and the prosecutor's
charging discretion remained intact to charge the defendant with child abuse
resulting in death and/or vehicular homicide."
C. Effect of a Multiple Punishment Violation When the General/Specific Statute
Rule Is Inapplicable
Once the Santillanes court found the general/specific statute rule to be
inapplicable in limiting the prosecutor's charging discretion, it still needed to
determine which of the defendant's convictions-vehicular homicide or child abuse
resulting in death-should be vacated to keep from violating the defendant's double
jeopardy protection against multiple punishments." ° The court considered two
separate doctrines as possible judicial solutions to this determination. First, the
Court turned to the "rule of merger" as clearly articulated in Pierce:
The rule of merger precludes an individual's conviction and sentence for a crime
that is a lesser included offense of a greater charge upon which defendant has
also been convicted. Although the state properly may charge in the alternative,
where defendant is convicted of one or more offenses which have merged into
the greater offense he [or she] may be punished for only one.'

94. Id. (quoting State v. Santillanes, 128 N.M. 752, 756, 998 P.2d 1203, 1207 (Ct. App. 2000), rev'd, 130
N.M. 464, 27 P.3d 456 (2001)).
95. Id. at 474, 27 P.3d at 466.
96. Id.
97. Id. Additionally, the court rejected the determination made by the Court of Appeals that the Legislature
could not have intended the death of a child by motor vehicle to be a greater offense than the death of an adult or
fetus. In making this rejection, the court notes that Section 66-8-101.1 makes it a third-degree felony to cause a
miscarriage or stillbirth as a result of a felony; whereas, causing the death of an adult or child during the commission
of a felony is a capital offense under Section 30-3-7(A). The court cites these and other statutes as evidence that the
Legislature intended heightened protection for children. Id. at 474-75, 27 P.3d at 466-67.
98. Id. at 474, 27 P.3d at 466.
99. Id. at 475, 27 P.3d at 467. It is important to note that while the prosecutor may charge both child abuse
resulting in death and vehicular homicide, convictions for both would violate the defendant's double jeopardy
protection against multiple punishments. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. (quoting State v. Pierce, 110 N.M. 76, 86-87, 792 P.2d 408, 418-19 (1990)).
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In general, the rule of merger requires the lesser-included offense to be vacated
to remedy the problem of impermissible multiple punishments." 2 However, the
court recognized that vehicular homicide and child abuse resulting in death cannot
be characterized as lesser-included and greater-inclusive offenses because they each
contain different elements."3 Despite this recognition, the court nonetheless found
that child abuse resulting in death is a greater offense than vehicular homicide; thus,
vehicular homicide merged into the convictions for child abuse resulting in death. "°
The factors the court used to create this modified rule of merger are the quantum of
punishment'0 5 and the separate mens rea requirements 6 for each of the two crimes.
The second doctrine the court examined and ultimately rejected is the "rule of
lenity," which counsels, "criminal statutes should be interpreted in the defendant's
favor when insurmountable ambiguity persists regarding the intended scope of a
criminal statute."'0 7 Thus, the rule of lenity becomes applicable when persistent
doubt about the Legislature's intent lingers even after applying the Blockburger
elements test and looking at the other indicia of legislative intent.0 8 The court found
the rule of lenity to only be applicable in the context of assessing legislative intent
to create multiple punishments, not in determining which conviction to vacate as a
result of impermissible multiple punishments."'° Thus, the court ultimately
concluded that vehicular homicide is a lesser offense than child abuse resulting in
death; therefore, it merged into child abuse resulting in death." 0
V. ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS
The New Mexico Supreme Court has stated that the primary goal of the
general/specific statute rule is to ascertain legislative intent when multiple
punishments are not authorized. By characterizing the application of the
general/specific statute rule as a necessary limitation on the charging discretion of
the prosecutor, the Santillanes court falls to see the potential application of the
general/specific statute rule and the rule of lenity in all cases that present a multiple
punishment violation. These two canons of statutory construction have the potential
to be applied hand-in-hand to assist courts in determining which of two conflicting
statutes to vacate when punishment under both would constitute a violation of the
defendant's double jeopardy protection.
Once a court finds the general/specific statute rule applicable in light of the
defendant's conduct, it is often faced with the daunting and unguided task of
determining which statute is specific. The New Mexico Supreme Court has yet to
102. Id. at 476, 27 P.3d at 468.
103. Id. (relying on a Blockburger elements analysis appearing earlier in the opinion to reach this conclusion).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 477-78, 27 P.3d at 468-69 (finding that child abuse resulting in death is a greater offense than
vehicular homicide because child abuse resulting in death is a first-degree felony punishable by 18 years mandatory
imprisonment, while vehicular homicide is merely a third-degree felony not requiring a mandatory sentence).
106. Id. at 477, 27 P.3d at 469 (finding that "the Legislature's view of the seriousness of these two offenses
cannot be determined by the applicable mens rea," but nonetheless stating that the lesser mens rea requirement for
child abuse resulting in death indicates that the Legislature views the crime as a greater offense).
107. Id. at 478, 27 P.3d at 470 (quoting State v. Ogden, 118 N.M. 234, 242, 880 P.2d 845, 853 (1994)).
108. Id.

109. Id.
110.

Id. at 479, 27 P.3d at 471.
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lay down workable standards for making this determination. In order to clarify the
application of the general/specific statute rule, the court should develop workable
standards for determining which of two conflicting statutes is the specific statute.
A. Determining the Applicability of the General/SpecificStatute Rule
The Supreme Court has repeatedly asserted that the primary goal in applying the
general/specific statute rule is to ascertain legislative intent when presented with
conflicting statutes."' In Santillanes, the court is particularly concerned by the
prospect of applying the general/specific statute rule in a manner that limits the
prosecutor's discretion." 2 The Santillanes court finds the general/specific statute
rule inapplicable because it could find no clear evidence of intent by the Legislature
to limit prosecutorial discretion.' " However, in characterizing the general/specific
statute rule as a necessary limitation on the prosecutor's discretion, the court fails
to utilize a potential broader application of the rule-"assist[ing] courts more
generally in determining whether the Legislature intended to create an exception to
a general statute by enacting another law dealing with the matter in a more specific
way."'i14
As the Santillanes court indicated, the prosecutor's charging discretion must
remain broad because "it is the [prosecutor] who is elected by the people of this state
to decide [the] very question of what charges to bring and what people to prosecute
in the best interest of the people of the State of New Mexico.""' 5 One of the
traditional functions of the general/specific statute rule is "to scrutinize the propriety
of a single charge of one crime as opposed to a different crime.""H6 This scrutiny
must take place regardless of whether the defendant's double jeopardy protection
is implicated.' '7 However, this inquiry should only arise when the elements of the
two crimes are essentially the same, because "[a]n identity in elements demonstrates
that the Legislature did not intend to punish separately under the two statutes for the
same conduct and intended to limit prosecutorial discretion.""8' '
Conversely, when each statute contains an element that the other does not, then
it is presumed that multiple punishments are authorized and the prosecutor has broad
discretion to charge the defendant under both statutes." 9 This presumption is

111. See State v. Cleve, 127 N.M. 240, 247, 980 P.2d 23, 30 (1999); see also Santillanes, 130 N.M. at 469,
27 P.3d at 461.
112. Santillanes, 130 N.M. at 472, 27 P.3d at 464 ("[C]ourts should apply the general/specific statute rule
guardedly to the extent that it operates to restrict the charging discretion of the prosecutor.").
113. Id. at 475, 27 P.3d at 467 ("[W]e conclude that the general/specific statute rule does not apply in this
case, and the prosecutor retained the discretion to charge Defendant with either vehicular homicide or child abuse
resulting in death, or both.").
114. Cleve, 127 N.M. at 252-53, 980 P.2d at 35-36.
115. Santillanes, 130 N.M. at 472, 27 P.3d at 465.
116. Id. at 469, 27 P.3d at 461 (quoting Cleve, 127 N.M. at 250, 980 P.2d at 27).
117. The Santillanescourt finds that an analysis of the general/specific statute rule must apply even if the
defendant was only charged with or convicted of one of the two crimes. Id. This is because a legislative intent to
authorize multiple punishments necessarily implies that the Legislature also intended to leave prosecutorial
discretion intact. Id.
118. Id.at471,27P.3dat463.
119. Id. Despite the necessity of granting broad charging discretion to the prosecutor, it is important to note
that this broad grant of discretion can potentially result in unconstitutional disparities between similarly situated
defendants. Therefore, the discretion is not entirely unlimited. See State v. Chavez, 77 N.M. 79, 82, 419 P.2d 456,
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necessary because the prosecutor should have the broad discretion to charge any
offense "[s]o long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused
committed an offense defined by statute."' 2 ° Additionally, when the elements of the
two statutes differ, the prosecutor must be given broad charging discretion because
the prosecutor is in the position of knowing what elements he can or cannot prove.
Thus, when each statute contains an independent element, it should be presumed that
the Legislature has created multiple punishments and does not intend to limit the
prosecutor's discretion.
The Santillanes court found that for the general/specific statute rule to apply
when each statute contains an element that the other does not, a defendant must
overcome each of two presumptions. First, he must show that the Legislature did not
intend multiple punishments. 1 ' Second, he must show that the Legislature also
intended to limit the charging power of the prosecutor.122 Only if he can overcome
each of these two presumptions does the general/specific statute rule apply.
Notwithstanding the difficulty in overcoming each of these presumptions, requiring
the defendant to overcome a presumption in favor of prosecutorial discretion before
applying the general/specific statute rule defeats a potentially broader function of
the general/specific statute rule-assisting the courts in determining which of two
conflicting statutes must be vacated when the Legislature did not intend multiple
punishments.
If the defendant is able to show that the Legislature did not intend multiple
punishments but cannot show that the Legislature intended to limit prosecutorial
discretion, then the court is faced with determining which of the two conflicting
statutes must be vacated. In order to make this determination, the Santillanes court
crafts a modified rule of merger whereby the lesser offense merges into the greater
offense.' This modified rule of merger is based on a faulty premise and fails to
address the predominant inquiry, which is determining which statute the Legislature
intends to apply to the exclusion of the other. The underlying premise is derived
from Pierce,'24 in which the Supreme Court found child abuse resulting in death to
be a lesser-included offense of first-degree murder based on the facts; therefore, it
vacated the defendant's conviction for child abuse resulting in death. This result was
necessary because of the unique nature of greater-inclusive and lesser-included
offenses-"[w]here one statute includes all elements of another statute and differs
from the lesser-included statute by virtue of an additional element, we can infer that
the Legislature intended the more inclusive statute to cover instances in which the

458 (1966) (stating [that the Supreme Court] "no longer subscribe[d] to th[e] view which would permit law
enforcement authorities to subject one person to the possibility of greater punishment than another who has
committed an identical act. This would do violence to the equal protection clauses of our state and federal
constitutions."); but see State v. Davis, 129 N.M. 773, 777, 14 P.3d 38, 42 (Ct. App. 2000) (distinguishing Chavez

on the grounds that it involved two virtually identical statutes and finding no equal protection violation in the
absence of a showing that prosecutorial discretion has in fact been exercised based on constitutionally impermissible
grounds).

120. Santillanes, 130 N.M. at 472, 27 P.3d at 464 (quoting State v. Ogden, 118 N.M. 234, 240-41, 880 P.2d
845, 851-52 (1994)).
121. Id. at 471,27 P.3d at 463.
122. Id.
123. See id. at 476-77, 27 P.3d at 468-69.
124. 110 N.M. 76, 792 P.2d 408 (1990).
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additional element was present."'23 However, in Santillanes, the offenses of child
abuse resulting in death and vehicular homicide cannot be characterized as greaterinclusive and lesser-included offenses because each statute contains an element that
the other does not.'26 When viewing the rule of merger under its correct lens, it
becomes apparent that it should play no role in assisting the court in determining
which conviction to vacate when each offense includes an element that the other
does not. Merger under this instance sheds no light on the Legislature's intent. In
summary, "a general use of the concepts of 'greater' and 'lesser' offenses ought not
replace a detailed inquiry into legislative intent in analyzing a double jeopardy
issue."' 27
In contrast, the general/specific statute rule has real potential value in assisting
the court to determine the Legislature's intent. After a double jeopardy violation has
been found, the question should not focus on whether the Legislature intended to
limit prosecutorial discretion but rather should focus on whether the Legislature has
enacted a law dealing with the defendant's conduct in a more specific manner.' 28 If
one of the two conflicting statutes addresses the defendant's conduct in a more
specific manner than the other, then absent clear legislative intent to the contrary,
it should be presumed that the Legislature intended for the defendant's conduct to
be punished under the more specific statute. 29
' The special statute should be applied
because the Legislature is presumed to have been focused on the special statute. 30
Thus, the general/specific statute rule has the potential to be used as a canon of
construction for determining which conviction the Legislature would intend to be
vacated when double jeopardy prevents both convictions from standing.' 3' Of course

125. Santillanes, 130 N.M. at 482, 27 P.3d at 474 (Minzner, J.,
dissenting).
126. Even the Santillanesmajority concedes that vehicular homicide and child abuse resulting in death cannot
be characterized as greater-inclsive and lesser-included offenses. However, the majority states that in Pierce the
rule of merger was applied to the convictions of child abuse resulting in death and deliberate-intent murder even
though those two offenses did not meet the traditional test for merger. Id. at 476, 27 P.3d at 468. In taking this
position, the majority mischaracterizes the application of the rule of merger in Pierce.The distinction between the
two offenses in Pierce was that deliberate-intent murder requires proof that the killing was perpetrated with
deliberate intent, whereas child abuse resulting in death did not require that the intent to kill be deliberate. Pierce,
110 N.M. at 86, 792 P.2d at 418. Therefore, under the facts of that case, child abuse resulting in death was actually
considered to be a lesser-included offense of deliberate-intent murder. See id.
127. Santillanes, 130 N.M. at 482, 27 P.3d at 474 (Minzner, J.,
dissenting).
128. See State v. Guilez, 129 N.M. 240, 244, 4 P.3d 1231, 1235 (1999).
129. See, e.g., State v. Arellano, 123 N.M. 589, 591,943 P.2d 1042, 1044 (Ct. App. 1997):
[T]he theory of the general/specific statute rule is that, if the specific statute was enacted later,
it was intended to carve out an exception to the general statute; if the specific statute was enacted
earlier, it was intended to remain an exception unless it was repealed in general words or by
implication....
State v. Blevins, 40 N.M. 367, 369-70, 60 P.2d 208, 210 (1936) ("[T]he general statute is not operative as to the
special kinds of property described in the special statute...."); State v. Yarborough, 120 N.M. 669, 905 P.2d 209
(1995) (finding that the Legislature intended to preempt involuntary manslaughter by enacting a more
comprehensive motor vehicle code); State v. Cleve, 127 N.M. 240, 250, 980 P.2d 23, 33 (1999) ("[Aln inquiry
under the general/specific statute rule should always focus primarily on whether the Legislature intended that the
specific law operate as an exception to the general law....").
130. See Cleve, 127 N.M. at 247, 980 P.2d at 30:
[The general/specific statute rule] in effect treats the special law as an exception to the general
law because the Legislature is presumed not to have intended a conflict between two of its
statutes and because the Legislature's attention is more particularly drawn to the relevant subject
matter in deliberating upon the special law.
131. See Yarborough, 120 N.M. at 669, 905 P.2d at 209 (stating that when two statutes apply to the same
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the court must not make this determination in a vacuum. The general/specific statute
rule is merely a starting point for the broader determination of actual legislative
intent. If it becomes clear by assessing "other indicia of legislative intent" that the
Legislature intends for the defendant's conduct to be punished under the general
32
statute, then the defendant must be punished under the more general statute.
Also, if insurmountable ambiguity persists regarding the intended scope of a
criminal statute, the rule of lenity applies so that ambiguity is interpreted in the
defendant's favor.133 This rule serves the purpose of "striking the appropriate
balance between the [L]egislature, the prosecutor, and the court defining criminal
liability.' 3 4 In Santillanes, the Supreme Court stated that "unlike a determination
of whether the Legislature intended multiple punishments for a single offense, the
rule of lenity does not apply to a determination of which conviction to vacate as a
result of impermissible multiple punishments."'' 3' However, in dismissing the rule
of lenity as a tool of statutory construction, the Santillanes court failed to see its
potential value in ascertaining the Legislature's intent when the application of two
conflicting statutes remains ambiguous.'36 In such a case of ambiguity, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly asserted that the ambiguous statutes must be interpreted in
favor of the defendant.' 37 However, the rule of lenity should be resorted to only in
"those situations in which reasonable doubt persists about [the] statute's intended
scope even after resort to language and structure, legislative history, and motivating
'
policies of [the] statute." 13
Although the rule of lenity is ultimately a last resort for
a court seeking to determine the Legislature's intent, a judicial application of the
rule of lenity does not foreclose the Legislature from making its intent more clear.
If the Legislature disagrees with the court's application of the rule of lenity, then the
Legislature certainly has the power to clarify its intention. 139 In this regard, the rule
of lenity in ambiguous situations is the best way to flesh out the Legislature's
intent. '"
Ultimately, the determination of which of two conflicting statues to vacate
following a double jeopardy violation is one of legislative intent. The
general/specific statute rule and the rule of lenity have the potential power to assist
courts in determining legislative intent that the Santillanescourt failed to recognize.

criminal conduct, the special statute should control); see also Arellano, 123 N.M. at 591, 943 P.2d at 1044 ("The
purpose of [the general/specific statute rule] is to implement the intent of the legislature....").
132. See Santillanes, 130 N.M. at 471, 27 P.3d at 463 ("The general/specific statute rule should not be applied
in a manner that ignores other rules of statutory construction.
133. State v. Ogden, 118 N.M. 234, 242, 880 P.2d. 845, 853 (1994).
134. Santillanes, 130 N.M. at 478, 27 P.3d at 470 (quoting Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 427
(1985)).
135. Id.
136. See State v. Landgraf, 121 N.M. 445, 454, 913 P.2d 252, 261 (Ct. App. 1996) ("Since legislatures often
produce little evidence of their intent regarding multiple punishment, the rule of lenity is often an appropriate tool
of statutory construction in such contexts.").
137. See, e.g., Ogden, 118 N.M. at 242, 880 P.2d at 853.
138. State v. Anaya, 123 N.M. 14, 24, 933 P.2d 223, 233 (1996).
139. See id.
at 25, 933 P.2d at 234 (stating that the judiciary is not a legislative body and it is the duty of the
Legislature to clarify its intent).
140. If the Legislature remains silent following the court's application of the rule of lenity, then it should be
presumed that the Legislature has acquiesced to its application. However, if the Legislature responds, then its intent
should be clear in future cases. In this way, applying the rule of lenity forces the Legislature to make its intent clear.

GENERAL/SPECIFIC STATUTE RULE

Spring 2002]

Figure # 5 - Modified Framework
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B. Applying the GeneralSpecific Statute Rule-Developing Workable Standards
for Determining Which Statute Is Specific
Finding that the general/specific statute rule should apply in a given case does not
end the court's inquiry. Once the court finds that the general/specific statute rule
applies, the court must still determine which of two applicable statutes is the more
specific statute for the defendant's conduct. Often this inquiry can be rather difficult
because the New Mexico Supreme Court has yet to lay down a workable standard
for determining which of two competing statutes is specific and which is general. 4 '
In the absence of a workable standard, courts may disproportionately and arbitrarily
find the statute with the greatest punishment to be the one that is the most specific. 42

141. See State v. Cleve, 127 N.M. 240, 251, 980 P.2d 23, 34 (1999) ("[flt may be difficult in some
circumstances to determine which of two laws can be characterized as specific.. .however, this difficulty does not
preclude application of the rule... [a]s with the interpretation of all statutes, courts should resort to traditional means
of ascertaining legislative intent."). Legislative intent should control this inquiry. Id. However, when legislative
intent cannot be found by resorting to traditional means of ascertaining legislative intent (such as the language,
histories, and purposes of the statutes), the courts should develop canons of construction that assist in determining
which statute is specific.
142. To some degree the difficulty in determining which statute is specific-vehicular homicide or child
abuse resulting in death-may have contributed to the Supreme Court in Santillanes finding the general/specific
statute rule to be inapplicable. By finding the rule to be inapplicable, the Santillanes court may have been evading
this difficult question of determining which of the two conflicting statutes is more specific as to the defendant's
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The Kansas Supreme Court has adopted a standard in which "[a] statute which
relates to persons or things as a class is a general law, while a statute which relates
to particular persons or things of a class is specific."'' 43 This standard has the
potential to resolve many conflicts that the court is facing, particularly those in
which two statutes prohibit the same particular conduct but create a separate offense
based on either the status of the offender, the victim, or a particular object.
This standard would not seem to apply in a situation where the conflict between
the two statutes is created by the manner in which each statute is violated. For
example, in State v. Gabaldon,'" the defendant's act of coerced fellatio violated the
provisions of the criminal sexual penetration statute and the criminal sexual contact
statute. Therefore, the conflict between the statutes was created by the manner in
which the act was committed rather than the status of the offender or victim. The
Court of Appeals in Gabaldonfound the criminal sexual penetration statute to be the
specific statute because it specifically prohibited a touching of the penis with the
tongue or lips, whereas the criminal sexual contact statute more generally prohibited
a touching of intimate parts. 4' Thus, a potential canon in applying the
general/specific statute rule is that the statute specifically forbidding the defendant's
particular conduct is the special statute, while the one prohibiting the defendant's
conduct as part of a class of broader conduct is the general statute.
If this potential canon of construction is applied to the facts in Santillanes, the
general/specific statute rule would dictate that the defendant's convictions of child
abuse resulting in death should be vacated. The act committed by the defendant in
Santillanes violates the provisions of both the vehicular homicide statute and the
child abuse resulting in death statute. However, the defendant's particular
conduct-reckless driving-is more specifically covered under the vehicular
homicide statute.' 46 Reckless driving would only be a part of a class of broader
conduct that is covered under the child abuse resulting in death statute. 47
Ultimately, the following two potential standards for applying the general/specific
statute rule could be utilized: (1) a statute relating to particular persons or things of
a class is specific, while a statute relating to persons or things is a general law, 148 and

conduct. The attraction of the rule of merger, although inappropriate in multiple punishment analyses, is its ease
of application. It is relatively easy to determine which of two conflicting offenses is greater; whereas, with no
workable standards in place, it may be much more difficult to determine which statute is more specific regarding
the defendant's conduct.
143. State v. Williams, 829 P.2d 892, 897 (Kan. 1992) (applying the standard to find that the State was
compelled to charge the defendant with "aggravated incest" when the alleged victim was his 14-year-old stepgranddaughter rather than charging him with "indecent liberties with a child").
144. 92 N.M. 93, 582 P.2d 1306(Ct. App. 1978).
145.

Id. at 94, 582 P.2d at 1307.

146. See State v. Santillanes, 130 N.M. 464, 480, 27 P.3d 456, 472 (2001) (Minzner, J.,
dissenting):
[Tihe greater specificity of the vehicular homicide statute demonstrates to me that the
Legislature focused on the conduct of which Defendant has been convicted when it enacted the
vehicular homicide statute. We have no indication, based on the language of the child abuse
statute, that the Legislature focused on the conduct when it enacted the child abuse statute.
147. See generally id. at 480-81, 27 P.3d at 472-73 (Minzner, J.,
dissenting) (finding the statutory language,
purpose, and history of the child abuse resulting in death statute to indicate that the Legislature did not intend for
the child endangerment language of that statute to be broadly construed so as to encompass the death of a child
resulting from a driving offense).
148. A comparison of the battery statute (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-3-4 (1997 Repl.)) with the child abuse statute
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(2) a statute specifically forbidding the defendant's particular conduct is specific,
while a statute that prohibits the defendants conduct as part of a class of broader
conduct is a general law.' 49 These standards and/or additional workable standards
would help clarify the manner in which the general/specific statute rule is applied.
VI. CONCLUSION
The New Mexico Supreme Court in Santillanes attempted to clarify the
application of the general/specific statute rule. However, the court formulated
an
unduly limited application that fails to utilize a potential function of
the
general/specific statute rule-assisting courts in determining which of two
conflicting statutes must be vacated when the Legislature did not intend multiple
punishments. Additionally, the Santillanes court further dismissed the potential
value of applying the rule of lenity in multiple punishment cases when the intent
of
the Legislature remains insurmountably ambiguous. Finally, in clarifying
the
application of the general/specific statute rule the Supreme Court still has yet
to
create workable standards for determining which of two competing statutes
is
specific and which is general. The development of workable standards would
potentially reduce unnecessary disparity and make the application of
the
general/specific statute rule more lucid.

(N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-6-1 (1997 Repl.)) can shed light on the application of this
standard. It is not difficult to
imagine a defendant's unitary conduct violating each of these separate statutes when
an adult hits a child. However,
under this standard, child abuse would be the more appropriate charge because
that statute deals with children as
a particular class of persons; whereas, the battery statute relates generally to any person.
149. A comparison of the embezzlement statute (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-16-8 (1997
Repl.)) with the computer
fraud statute (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-45-3 (1997 Repl.)) helps make the application
of this standard more lucid. A
defendant who accesses a computer to embezzle money violates each of these statutes.
However, the computer fraud
statute is more specific to the defendant's conduct than the general embezzlement
statute. Thus, if convictions under
each of these statutes would violate the defendant's double jeopardy protection against
multiple punishments, the
embezzlement conviction should be vacated and the computer fraud conviction should
stand.

